Syria: Bring back the carrots = - Editorials & Commentary

NEW=20 YORK The United States is once again angry at Syria = - and=20 with good reason. Syrian radicals are crossing the border to = join=20 the insurgency in Iraq in increasing numbers. Damascus has = cut back=20 on intelligence cooperation with Washington. The Syrian = government=20 is once again demonstrating its disproportionate ability to=20 frustrate progress in the Middle East.=20

Why then = should the Bush=20 administration cut Bashar Assad's government a little slack? = Because, in the long run, Assad's presidency is Syria's best = hope=20 for reform, and because a nuanced approach to U.S.-Syrian = relations=20 gives Washington its best chance at achieving the outcomes = it wants=20 in the region.

When Bashar = Assad=20 assumed power after his father's death in 2000, Washington = hoped=20 Syria would move steadily toward political and economic = reform.=20 Assad, then 34, lacked the military background that trained = so many=20 Syrians in the management of his father's police state. (He = instead=20 studied ophthalmology in Britain.) The younger Assad seemed = an=20 intelligent, reform-minded technocrat whose chief title, = before he=20 became president, was head of the Syrian Computer Service. = Assad is=20 widely credited with overseeing the introduction of the = Internet to=20 Syria in 1999 - albeit with censored content - and with = founding=20 Syria's first mobile-phone network.=20

The Bush = administration=20 initially adopted a good-cop, bad-cop approach to dealing = with=20 Assad's new government. As the Iraq war began, Donald = Rumsfeld and=20 John Bolton took turns threatening Syria with dire = consequences if=20 it did not renounce its alleged program for chemical and = biological=20 weapons and turn its back on Saddam's loyalists in Iraq. But = not=20 long after, Colin Powell, then secretary of state, = demonstrated the=20 administration's willingness to work with Assad by visiting=20 Damascus.=20

The two-track = strategy=20 yielded results. Syria offered valuable intelligence = cooperation in=20 the war on terror. Assad freed large numbers of political = prisoners.=20 His government helped the U.S. military monitor Syria's = border with=20 Iraq and passed a number of fugitive Saddam loyalists into = U.S.=20 custody. Unlike Iran, Syria has negotiated with European = states,=20 largely in good faith, toward a resolution of questions = surrounding=20 its weapons programs. Syria's border with Israel remained = quiet.=20 Hezbollah, Syria's armed proxy in Lebanon, curtailed rocket = attacks=20 on Israelis.

Crucially, = Syria ended=20 its three-decade occupation of Lebanon. After February's=20 assassination, possibly by Syrian security forces, of = Lebanon's=20 former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, and in response to = strong=20 international pressure, Assad pledged to remove Syria's = 14,000=20 troops. And suspending judgment for the moment on U.S. = charges that=20 Syrian intelligence operatives are flowing back into Lebanon = to=20 carry out assassinations and other hostile operations, Assad = kept=20 his promise. In the process, he purged the senior ranks of = the=20 security services of several hard-line holdovers from the = days of=20 his father's repressive rule.=20

That's why = Assad is now=20 scrambling to contain the damage he's done to his standing = with=20 powerful members of the old guard. It's ironic that two of = his most=20 welcome reforms, the Lebanon retreat and the security = service purge,=20 have now pushed the Syrian president toward actions that = anger the=20 White House.=20

Several = factors limit=20 Assad's domestic political capital. Like his father, Assad = belongs=20 to the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam whose = political=20 dominance is deeply resented by Syria's majority Sunnis. = Second,=20 Assad lacks his father's talent for inspiring both = admiration and=20 fear among the elite and the general population. Finally, = many=20 older-generation officials have never fully trusted him to = protect=20 their privileges or to maintain a hard-line approach to = Israel and=20 the West. Assad has gotten rid of some of them, but not all.

As a result, = Assad has=20 moved to appease those among Syria's governing circle most=20 suspicious of his intentions. Hence less cooperation with = U.S.=20 intelligence and the Syrian Sunni radicals filtering into = Iraq. It's=20 a calculated move. Beyond appeasement of his domestic = critics, Assad=20 believes Sunni radicals are less threat to him in Iraq than = they=20 would be at home.=20

In response, = President=20 George W. Bush has sidelined his good cops and dispatched = the bad=20 cops to intimidate Assad into greater cooperation. Last = month, Bush=20 renewed sanctions that halt most U.S. exports to Syria and = sharply=20 limit transactions between U.S. banks and Syria's national = bank.

There is no = question the=20 United States should respond sharply to any Syrian moves to = aid=20 Iraq's insurgency. But what's needed is the more nuanced = approach of=20 Bush's first term - some carrots as well as sticks.=20

There is = reason to hope=20 political and economic reform in Syria will continue and = even=20 intensify. On June 6, at the opening of the 10th Baath Party = Congress in Damascus, Syria's vice president, Abdul Halim = Khaddam,=20 offered his resignation. Over the course of his 30-year = career as a=20 senior Baath Party leader, Khaddam has fiercely defended = Syria's=20 single-party system and was the senior official most = directly=20 responsible for Syria's day-to-day management of Lebanese = politics.=20 For a party congress expected to focus on reform, his offer = of=20 resignation is a hopeful sign.

Assad has, so = far, made=20 only limited progress in political and economic reform, but = that is=20 certainly preferable to what lies ahead for U.S.-Syria = relations if=20 Assad is shoved aside by the hard-liners.

A more nuanced = and=20 patient U.S. approach has produced progress over the last = four=20 years. If administration hawks enable the hard-liners to = unseat=20 Assad, the long-term result will be bad for Iraq, for = Israel, and=20 for Syria - and it will be bad for the United States.

(Ian = Bremmer is=20 president of the Eurasia Group and a senior fellow at the = World=20 Policy Institute.)

=20 Syria: Bring back the carrots