Received: (qmail 28974 invoked from network); 9 Oct 2006 22:33:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO pre-smtp13-01.prod.mesa1.secureserver.net) ([64.202.189.245]) (envelope-sender ) by smtp11-01.prod.mesa1.secureserver.net (qmail-ldap-1.03) with SMTP for ; 9 Oct 2006 22:33:33 -0000 Received: (qmail 27472 invoked from network); 9 Oct 2006 22:33:33 -0000 Received: from unknown (HELO rwcrmhc14.comcast.net) ([216.148.227.154]) (envelope-sender ) by pre-smtp13-01.prod.mesa1.secureserver.net (qmail-ldap-1.03) with SMTP for ; 9 Oct 2006 22:33:29 -0000 Received: from pc1 (c-67-180-163-86.hsd1.ca.comcast.net[67.180.163.86]) by comcast.net (rwcrmhc14) with SMTP id <20061009223327m14003rt7qe>; Mon, 9 Oct 2006 22:33:27 +0000 Message-ID: <003501c6ebf2$e288d8b0$0200a8c0@PC1> Reply-To: "Pointer" From: "Pointer" To: "Pointer @LittleHornArchive.com" Subject: Saudi Arabia Woos China and India Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 15:32:58 -0700 Organization: LittleHornArchive.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="multipart/alternative"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.2869 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2962 X-Nonspam: Statistical 65% X-NAS-Classification: 0 X-NAS-MessageID: 17111 X-NAS-Validation: {90CAE177-5BA4-4FB6-A837-23BBD659225E} This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0032_01C6EBB8.328D03D0" ------=_NextPart_001_0032_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable =20 MEF News Mailing List October 5, 2006 =20 =20 MEF Home | Research & Writings | Middle East Quarterly = | Unsubscribe =20 Saudi Arabia Woos China and India by Harsh V. Pant Middle East Quarterly Fall 2006 http://www.meforum.org/article/1019 In January 2006, Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud = visited China and India, a trip some commentators labeled "a strategic = shift" in Saudi foreign policy and reflective of "a new era" for the = kingdom.[1] It was King Abdullah's first trip outside the Middle East = since taking the throne in August 2005, and it was also the first trip = by a Saudi ruler to China since the two countries established diplomatic = relations in 1990. Abdullah's travel was significant. His reception suggested both = Chinese and Indian recognition of the House of Saud's role in regulating = global oil prices and the impact that Saudi oil policy has not only on = Western economies but on the Chinese and Indian economies as well. = Riyadh's relations with Beijing and Delhi are not shaped by energy = alone, however. There is a major political component to Saudi strategic = thinking. The royal family wishes to engage China and India in order to = create a political alternative to its relationship with the United = States. Saudi thinkers may believe that an Asian alternative will make = the kingdom less susceptible to Western pressure on such issues as = democratization and terror financing. While Saudi outreach toward the = Asian giants will accelerate in coming years, it will not provide Riyadh = with a panacea but rather will still require all parties to confront = difficult foreign policy choices they may wish to avoid. Sino-Saudi Relations: Broad-Based Engagement=20 Many Saudi officials, annoyed with U.S. pressure to cease funding = Islamist and terrorist groups, find Beijing's no-questions-asked = policies attractive. Beijing and Riyadh are in one key way alike, in = that both seek to take advantage of economic globalization without = endangering their political status quo. That Beijing was the first stop on King Abdullah's Asian tour = symbolized China's growing profile. The Chinese government has worked = hard to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil = exporter.[2] In 2004, the two countries inaugurated a series of regular = political consultations. That same year, China's state oil company, = Sinopec, signed a deal to explore gas in Saudi Arabia's vast Empty = Quarter (Rub al-Khali). Then, in December 2005, Beijing held its first = formal talks with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries = (OPEC). Reflective of the growing breadth of Sino-Saudi relations, = Abdullah used his visit not only to sign a pact on energy cooperation = and joint investment in oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits but also = to conclude broader economic, trade, taxation, and technical accords, a = vocational training agreement, and to finalize a Saudi Arabian = Development Bank urban development loan for the historic Muslim Chinese = city of Aksu in the western province of Xinjiang.[3] Still, energy is the backbone of the relationship. Until 1993, = China was a net oil exporter,[4] but it has since become the = second-greatest oil consumer after the United States. More than half of = Chinese oil imports originate in the Persian Gulf with 15 percent in = Saudi Arabia. Total Saudi-Chinese trade grew 59 percent in 2005 to US$14 = billion and may reach $40 billion in the next four to five years.[5] By = 2010, the Middle East might account for 95 percent of China's imported = oil.[6] Saudi Arabia has also emerged as a major investor in Chinese = refineries. In 1999, Saudi Arabia's Aramco Overseas Company provided a = $750 million investment-25 percent of the total project-in a = petrochemical complex in Fujian capable of processing 8 million tons of = Saudi crude oil per annum. Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with several = members of OPEC, intends to build a new refinery in Guangzhou involving = a total investment of $8 billion.[7] Sino-Saudi trade and investment will only increase. During his = trip, Abdullah invited Chinese businessmen to invest in Saudi Arabia and = take advantage of the kingdom's economic reforms and privatization of = some state-owned firms. Beijing and Riyadh plan to expand bilateral = investments with emphasis on energy, infrastructure, and = telecommunications.[8] The Saudi government may seek Chinese assistance = as it works towards diversifying its economy. Already, Saudi Arabia is China's biggest trading partner in the = greater Middle East, and China is Saudi Arabia's fourth-largest importer = and fifth largest exporter while Saudi Arabia is China's tenth-largest = importer and largest crude oil supplier.[9] Chinese industrial goods are = increasingly displacing Western products in the Saudi markets, affecting = Saudi attitudes towards the relative importance of the United States and = China. Such a trend may accelerate if Chinese government plans to sign a = free trade agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council come to = fruition.[10] In the last two years, growing bilateral trade has led to = three rounds of free trade area negotiations, most recently in January = 2006. The new economic symbiosis is having an increasing impact on Saudi = Arabia's military and political posture. Riyadh once relied on = Washington for its defense.[11] But while Washington was a major = military supplier, it was not the only one. Between 1990 and 1994, the = Saudi Defense and Aviation Ministry spent $50 billion purchasing = military hardware, not only from the United States but also Great = Britain, France, and China.[12] In the 1980s, the kingdom sought to tap the Chinese arms market. = In 1985, the Saudi government risked Washington's ire to import Chinese = CSS-2 nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a = 3,000-kilometer range. With the CSS-2 becoming obsolete, Riyadh is = considering purchase of the upgraded, solid-fuelled CSS-5 and CSS-6 with = a range of 1800 and 600 kilometers respectively.[13] It is not just the Saudi government that is happy to find an = alternative to its traditional dependence on Washington. Chinese = authorities are happy to provide a political and diplomatic alternative = for states such as Saudi Arabia that are upset with U.S. pressure to = curtail support for terrorism and perceived U.S. interference in = domestic affairs. After all, Beijing and many Arab governments share = suspicions of U.S. policy.[14] China's president, Hu Jintao, visited = Riyadh in April 2006 and addressed the Shura, the consultative council = that advises the king. It is an honor that has been granted to only a = select few foreign leaders. The latest U.S. National Security Strategy = declares the White House's belief that "the fundamental character of = regimes matters as much as the distribution of power among the states" = and reiterated Washington's goal "to help create a world of democratic, = well-governed states that can meet the needs of citizens and conduct = themselves responsibly in the international system."[15] Such objectives = threaten equally the Chinese government and that of Saudi Arabia, which = is-with Libya and Syria-among the most autocratic and arbitrary regimes = in the Arab Middle East.[16] Many Arab governments also see Beijing's = U.N. Security Council veto as an important counterbalance to U.S. = hyper-power.[17] Saudi-Indian Relations: Mutual Interests? From China, King Abdullah flew to India, Asia's other emerging = giant, where he was a guest of honor at India's national Republic Day = celebrations. It was the first visit of a Saudi monarch to India since = King Saud's brief visit to the subcontinent in 1955. Relations = subsequently froze, as Riyadh sided with Washington during the Cold War, = and New Delhi drifted closer to Moscow. Saudi-Indian ties strained = further after the Indian government failed to condemn the 1979 Soviet = invasion of Afghanistan while the Saudi government helped bankroll the = opposition Afghan mujahideen.[18] However, with the Cold War over, such = impediments to Saudi-Indian relations evaporated. The two countries have significant interests beyond oil. While = India is not a Muslim-majority country, it still hosts the = second-largest Muslim population in the world,[19] a constituency that = remains interested in Saudi Arabia as the site of the holy shrines at = Mecca and Medina. There is already significant cultural interchange. = Approximately 1.5 million Indian workers constitute the largest = expatriate community in the kingdom.[20] Riyadh, for its part, has agreed to support New Delhi's petition = for observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference. It has = also been supportive of Indian moves to reduce tension in Kashmir and = has tried to move beyond its traditional approach of looking at India = through a Pakistani prism. New Delhi has also cultivated Riyadh for strategic reasons. To = Indian strategists, any ally that can act as a counterweight to Pakistan = in the Islamic world is significant. Initially, New Delhi sought to = cultivate Tehran, but such efforts stumbled in recent years as the = Islamic Republic has adopted an increasingly aggressive anti-Western = posture.[21] Saudi Arabia now fills that gap. Indeed, Iranian nuclear = ambitions have helped draw New Delhi and Riyadh closer. The Saudi government has its own reasons for cultivating Indian = ties. Saudi Arabia and Iran have long competed for power and influence = in the Persian Gulf.[22] The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran added a new = edge to the rivalry, as Iranian ayatollahs sought increasingly to = challenge the Saudi officials on religious matters, such as the rules = and regulations surrounding the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca. The fact = that about 40 percent of Saudi Arabia's oil-producing eastern province = is Shi'ite and resents Wahhabi rule worries Riyadh.[23] The anxiety is = mutual. In 1994, the Iranian intelligence ministry designated Salafi = terrorism as the primary threat to Iranian national security.[24] = Tehran's nuclear drive, Iranian interference in neighboring Iraq, and = Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's aggressive rhetoric further = raise Saudi anxiety of a resurgent Iran, and all were subjects of = discussion during the king's meeting with the Indian prime minister.[25] Still, the relationship is not all rosy. The Indian military has = been fighting separatist groups in its northern state of Kashmir for = several years now. Thousands of lives have been lost because of Islamist = terrorism or the associated crackdown. Saudi financiers bankroll many of = the Pakistani and Kashmiri groups that conduct the terrorism.[26] The = Indian government would like its Saudi counterparts to manage the funds = transferred to India better, a substantial portion of which ends in = Islamist pockets. The Indian prime minister and Saudi king used their = New Delhi meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding dealing with = terrorism, transnational crime, and underworld operations.[27] Both = governments agreed to cooperate toward the conclusion of a comprehensive = convention on international terrorism before the U.N. General Assembly = and to establish an international counterterrorism center as called for = by the International Conference on Counter-Terrorism held in Riyadh in = February 2005.[28] While the Indian government would like political reforms to take = hold in Saudi Arabia to mitigate the Islamist threat,[29] energy is now = the driving force in Saudi-Indian relations. Riyadh is the chief = supplier of oil to India's booming economy, and India is now the fourth = largest recipient of Saudi oil after China, the United States, and = Japan.[30] India's crude oil imports from the Saudi kingdom will likely = double in the next twenty years.[31] During his visit to India, the = Saudi king emphasized his country's commitment to uninterrupted supplies = to a friendly country such as India regardless of global price = trends.[32] As with Saudi Arabia and China, energy infrastructure investment = is a major component in the development of Saudi-Indian relations. = During the state visit, King Abdullah and Indian prime minister Manmohan = Singh signed an Indo-Saudi "Delhi Declaration" calling for a = wide-ranging strategic partnership, putting energy and economic = cooperation on overdrive, and committing to cooperate against = terrorism.[33] According to some reports, the king waived off Saudi = bureaucratic concerns about precedents the declaration might create with = regard to its relations with India's neighbors, especially Pakistan, by = calling India a "special case." [34] The private Indian energy firm Reliance will invest in a refinery = and petrochemicals project in Saudi Arabia, and India's state-owned = energy firm, Oil and Energy Gas Corporation, will also engage Saudi = Arabia as its equity partner for a refinery project in the Indian state = of Andhra Pradesh.[35] The Iranian government's decision to renege on = some oil supply commitments in the aftermath of India's vote against = Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also spurred = New Delhi to diversify suppliers. There are more than 100 Indian joint = ventures in Saudi Arabia and about half that number of Saudi joint = ventures in India.[36] As the king visited New Delhi, close to eighty = top Saudi businessmen participated in the first "Saudi Arabia in India" = business exhibition. A new Saudi-India Joint Business Council will = provide an institutional framework to expand bilateral economic ties. = Saudi authorities hope that such a channel can tap Indian expertise and = help it diversify its economy in fields ranging from information = technology and biotechnology to education and small business = development. Geopolitical Impediments While Riyadh might welcome its upgraded relations with both = Beijing and New Delhi, constraints might limit future expansion of their = ties. Sino-Indian energy competition may force an unpalatable choice = upon Saudi officials. And once Washington is thrown into the mix, the = picture becomes more complicated. With the United States viewing China = as its greatest future challenge[37] and Washington working actively to = bolster U.S.-Indian ties,[38] joint pressures upon Riyadh will only = build. U.S. officials are already concerned that Beijing's outreach to = the Middle East has undercut nonproliferation efforts and challenged = U.S. standing.[39] Riyadh's close relationship to Islamabad will also constrain its = relations with India. Pakistan not only receives oil from Saudi Arabia = at discounted rates, but there remains speculation that Saudi interests = underwrote Pakistan's nuclear program and missile purchases,[40] = presumably to allow Saudi Arabia ready access to nuclear and ballistic = missile technology if the need arose. Pressure has increased on Saudi = Arabia to open its nuclear facilities as the IAEA suspects that = Pakistani nuclear cooperation has advanced Saudi Arabia's program to a = level warranting international safeguards.[41] Washington also wants = Riyadh to provide unhindered access to its nuclear facilities. The = Saudis argue that they would do so only if other states-Israel-do the = same.[42] Saudi authorities may also be uncomfortable with improvements in = Chinese and Indian relations with Israel.[43] Neither Beijing nor New = Delhi may accept Saudi pressure to downgrade their relationship to = Jerusalem; unwillingness to compromise on their antagonism toward the = Jewish state may pose a quandary for hard-line Saudi officials. Nor will = Riyadh enjoy a monopoly over outreach to the two Asian giants. Despite = recent tension in Indo-Iranian relations, Indian officials insist that = the 1,625-mile, $4.16-billion pipeline project to transport gas from = Iran through Pakistan to India remains on track.[44] Chinese firms have = also increased their investment in Iran.[45] A more significant impediment, especially with regard to India, is = the proliferation of Saudi-funded religious schools in the country. The = Salafi movement has taken advantage of India's liberal environment and = Muslim unease with resurgent Hindu nationalism to preach radicalism to = India's 130-million strong Muslim populace. A madrasa (Islamic school) education in India has long been a part = of many Muslim children's lives. Madrasas in India number between 8,000 = and 40,000.[46] But concerns have been rising in India about the dated = and, with Saudi financing, increasingly radical curricula. In 2001, a = report of the Group of Ministers on "Reforming the National Security = System" recommended the need to modernize madrasa education.[47] Saudi financial assistance has gone to a range of Indian-Islamic = organizations resulting in the establishment of mosques, madrasas, and = publishing houses inculcating the Saudi worldview.[48] Riyadh also = provides scholarships to Indian students to study religion in its = universities. These Saudi-educated imams often return and preach Salafi = ideology to unemployed and susceptible Indian Muslims.[49] Some of the = returning Indians also transfer funds to local Islamic institutions, = often through the hawala system in which no records of individual = transactions are produced.[50] The Ahle-Hadith (People of the Tradition of the Prophet), a Sunni = Islamic sect with ties to the Saudi state dating back to the 1920s, has = arguably been the biggest beneficiary of Saudi monetary assistance = contributing to internecine rivalries among various Indian Muslim = sects.[51] Several Indian madrasas that follow the Ahle-Hadith tradition = have begun to emphasize their closeness with the Saudi Salafis. While = the early Ahle-Hadith was in many ways progressive, it has now altered = into an intolerant, literalist strand. Several Indian Islamic jurists and scholars seem to have = gravitated towards this Saudi-sanctioned, radical interpretation of = Islam and to a conspiratorial version of global politics. Instructive in = this context is a claim made by a Muslim jurist from the Deoband sect in = India that "should it be proved that Osama was the mastermind behind the = attacks of September 11, he would not be punished under Islamic law = since his actions were the result of an independent, legal opinion = issued by top jurists."[52] Another Islamic scholar from a prominent = seminary in north India has argued that "a worldwide anti-Muslim = alliance has been formed and is headed by the U.S. It runs in an arc = from Hindu fundamentalist India, through China and Russia, and ends with = Europe and the U.S. in the west. The effect is to encircle and choke the = Islamic world."[53] Terrorism will brake Saudi relations with both Asian powers. New = Delhi and Riyadh differ over the definition of terrorism. Most Arab = states, including Saudi Arabia, argue in the context of the = Israeli-Palestinian conflict that liberation struggles justify acts of = terror; the Indian government categorically opposes terrorist attacks on = civilians. The two states had intended to sign a mutual legal assistance = treaty on criminal matters during the king's visit. Such a treaty = usually serves as a precursor to an extradition treaty. But, unable to = break the impasse, the two sides' diplomats could only agree to a = watered-down memorandum of understanding on combating crime.[54] New = Delhi is especially sensitive given Saudi links to jihadi groups such as = Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have staged attacks within India.[55] The group = has tried to recruit Indian Muslims-so far with only limited success-for = its radical causes from the Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia and other = states in the Persian Gulf. It has been claimed that, despite the best = efforts of Lashkar, it has not been very successful in wooing Muslim = youth in India.[56] The Chinese government's autocratic character has retarded the = spread of Salafism in China, relative to the traction extremists have = found in the more permissive Indian society.[57] There are approximately = twenty million Muslims in China and more than 40,000 Islamic places of = worship, at least half of which are in the northwestern province of = Xinjiang[58] where Chinese repression is severe. Not only does the state = censor sermons, but Chinese officials also ask imams to focus on the = damage caused to Islam by terrorism in the name of religion.[59] Chinese = authorities often charge practicing Muslims there with incitement, = separatism, and Islamic extremism. There has been some evidence of small = numbers of Chinese-Muslim Uighurs fighting with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan = with a few even incarcerated at Guantanamo.[60] But even if Chinese = authorities conflate religion with Uighur separatism, they still = acknowledge that separatist activities have decreased in recent = years.[61] Nevertheless, Chinese oppression of eight million ethnic Uighur = Sunnis not to mention other Chinese Muslims may complicate its future = relationship with Saudi officials. Uighur grievances are unlikely to = dissipate.[62] As Sino-Saudi ties expand, Saudi religious activists may = draw parallels between Xinjiang and the West Bank, Gaza, and Kashmir. Conclusion It is simplistic to assume that Saudi Arabia is fashioning its = foreign policy only in opposition to that of the United States. = Nevertheless, the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led war on terror = caused both Riyadh and Washington to reevaluate their "special = relationship." It is in this context that Riyadh has begun courting an = Asian alternative. Riyadh's relations with Beijing and New Delhi are on = an upward swing as a consequence of shifting global political and = economic realities and are unlikely to alter as a result of a change in = Saudi leadership. The prospects for a tight Sino-Saudi relationship, however, are = rosier than a future Indo-Saudi relationship. Simply put, the threat of = Islamism and friction between autocratic Saudi Arabia and democratic = India are too great. This may create complications in the long-term but = in the near-term, Saudi Arabia's "look east" policy is firmly on track, = and the United States will have to configure its foreign policy = accordingly. Harsh V. Pant is a lecturer in the defense studies department at = King's College, London. [1] International Herald Tribune, Jan. 26, 2006. [2] Jin Liangxiang, "Energy First: China and the Middle East," = Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 3-10. [3] "China, Saudi Arabia Forge Closer Relationship," China Daily = (Beijing), Jan. 24, 2006. [4] Matthew Forney, "China's Quest for Oil," Time, Oct. 25, 2004. [5] Associated Press, Jan. 23, 2006. [6] Ibid. [7] Financial Times (London), Jan. 24, 2006. [8] Hindustan Times (New Delhi), Jan. 24, 2005. [9] The New York Times, Apr. 23, 2006. [10] China Daily, July 7, 2004. [11] Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America's Uneasy = Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), = pp. 56-60. [12] Ibid., p. 207. [13] Dan Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China and the Middle East," = Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 11-9. [14] Arab News (Jeddah), May 2, 2006. [15] The National Security Strategy of the United States of = America, White House, Mar. 2006, p. 1. [16] Saliba Sarsar, "Democracy in the Middle East: Quantifying = Arab Democracy," Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 21-8. [17] Arab News (Jeddah), May 2, 2006. [18] P.R. Mudiam, India and the Middle East (London: British = Academic Press, 1994), pp. 85-97. [19] Detailed statistics can be found at "Census of India," Table = 1: Total Population, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs. [20] Divya Pakkiasamy, "Saudi Arabia's Plan for Changing Its = Workforce," Migration Information Service, Nov. 1, 2004. [21] See Harsh V. Pant, "India and Iran: An 'Axis' in the Making," = Asian Survey, May/June 2004, pp. 369-83. [22] R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in = the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. = 8-11. [23] Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First = Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, and Energy Dimensions (London: = Praeger, 2003), p. 206. [24] Mahan Abedin, "The Iranian Intelligence Services and the War = on Terror," Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, May 20, 2004. [25] Indian Express (New Delhi), Jan. 24, 2006. [26] Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi = Groups," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 1, pp. 23-4; J. = Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad (Cambridge: Cambridge = University Press, 2006), pp. 26-50. [27] The Hindu (Chennai, Madras), Jan. 26, 2006. [28] "Final Report of the Counter-Terrorism International = Conference," Riyadh, Feb. 5-8, 2005. [29] The Indian Express (New Delhi), Jan. 24, 2006. [30] The Hindu Business Line (Chennai), Mar. 29, 2005. [31] Ibid. [32] Hindustan Times, Jan. 25, 2006. [33] "Delhi Declaration," Joint Declarations and Statements, = Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, India, Jan. 27, 2006. [34] The Tribune (New Delhi), Jan. 27, 2006. [35] Arab News, Jan. 6, 2005. [36] Press Trust of India news agency, Jan. 21, 2006. [37] "Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2006," U.S. Department of = Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, pp. 29-30; Richard R. Russell, "Oil for = Missiles," The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 25, 2006. [38] "President Discusses Strong U.S.-India Partnership in New = Delhi, India," White House news release, Mar. 3, 2006. [39] Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China and the Middle East." [40] Thomas Woodrow, "The Sino-Saudi Connection," China Brief, = Jamestown Foundation, Oct. 24, 2002. [41] Paul Kerr, "IAEA Board Seeks Strengthened Safeguards," Arms = Control Today, July/Aug. 2005. [42] Ibid. [43] On Sino-Israeli ties, see P.R. Kumaraswamy, "At What Cost = Israel-China Ties?" Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006, pp. 37-44; Dan = Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China and the Middle East," Middle East = Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 11-9. On India-Israel ties, see Harsh V. = Pant, "India-Israel Partnership: Convergence and Constraints," Middle = East Review of International Affairs, Dec. 2004, pp. 60-73. [44] Associated Foreign Press, Feb. 24, 2006. [45] Financial Times, Jan. 4, 2006. [46] Amir Ullah Khan, Mohammad Sadiq and Zafar H. Anjum, "To Kill = the Mockingbird," India China Economic and Cultural Centre, New Delhi, = accessed June 28, 2006. [47] "Reforming the National Security System-Recommendations of = the Group of Ministers," Feb. 19, 2001. [48] Yoginder Sikand, "Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the = Saudi Connection," Jamia Hamdard University, accessed June 28, 2006. [49] Pakkiasamy, "Saudi Arabia's Plan for Changing Its Workforce." [50] Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups." [51] Sikand, "Intra-Muslim Rivalries in India and the Saudi = Connection." [52] Quoted in Bernard Haykel, "The Silence of Moderate Muslims," = The Dawn (Karachi), Dec. 5, 2002. [53] Ibid. [54] "What's Terror? India, Saudi Differ," Hindustan Times, Jan. = 27, 2006. [55] G. Parthasarthy, "Saudi-Pakistani Nexus on Terrorism," The = Tribune, Sept. 25, 2003; Husain Haqqani, "India's Islamist Groups," = Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 3, pp. 10-23. [56] B. Raman, "Al-Qaeda, the IIF and Indian Muslims," = International Terrorism Monitor, South Asia Analysis Group, paper = no.1743 (34), Mar. 20, 2006. [57] "Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in = Xinjiang," Human Rights Watch, Apr. 2005, p. 12. [58] "China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," International = Religious Freedom Report 2005, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and = Labor, U.S. State Department, Nov. 8, 2005. [59] Ibid. [60] Ibid, p. 8.; Paul Wiseman, "China Equates Muslim Rebels with = Terrorists," USA Today, June 20, 2002; The Washington Post, Dec. 15, = 2005. [61] "China," International Religious Freedom Report 2005. [62] Igor Rotar, "The Growing Problem of Uighur Separatism," China = Brief, Jamestown Foundation, Apr. 15, 2004. To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East Quarterly, = please see details about an affordable subscription. Printer-friendly version Related Items a.. Other items from the Fall 2006 Middle East Quarterly=20 b.. Other items in category Saudi Arabia=20 c.. Other items in category China=20 =20 To unsubscribe from the MEF News list, go to = http://www.meforum.org/unsubscribe.php To subscribe to the MEF News list, go to = http://www.meforum.org/subscribe.php To receive alerts of MEF staff media appearances, please sign up = for the MEF Alerts mailing list at: http://www.meforum.org/subscribe.php You may freely forward this information, but on condition that you = send the text as an integral whole along with complete information about = its author, date, and source. =20 ------=_NextPart_001_0032_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
 

MEF News Mailing List
October 5,=20 2006

  MEF=20 Home   |    Research &=20 Writings   |   Middle East=20 Quarterly   |    Unsubscribe  

Saudi Arabia Woos China and India

by Harsh V. Pant
Middle East Quarterly
Fall = 2006
http://www.meforum.org/artic= le/1019

In January 2006, Saudi king Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al-Saud = visited=20 China and India, a trip some commentators labeled "a strategic = shift" in=20 Saudi foreign policy and reflective of "a new era" for the = kingdom.[1] It was King Abdullah's = first trip=20 outside the Middle East since taking the throne in August 2005, = and it was=20 also the first trip by a Saudi ruler to China since the two = countries=20 established diplomatic relations in 1990.

Abdullah's travel was significant. His reception suggested both = Chinese=20 and Indian recognition of the House of Saud's role in regulating = global=20 oil prices and the impact that Saudi oil policy has not only on = Western=20 economies but on the Chinese and Indian economies as well. = Riyadh's=20 relations with Beijing and Delhi are not shaped by energy alone, = however.=20 There is a major political component to Saudi strategic thinking. = The=20 royal family wishes to engage China and India in order to create a = political alternative to its relationship with the United States. = Saudi=20 thinkers may believe that an Asian alternative will make the = kingdom less=20 susceptible to Western pressure on such issues as democratization = and=20 terror financing. While Saudi outreach toward the Asian giants = will=20 accelerate in coming years, it will not provide Riyadh with a = panacea but=20 rather will still require all parties to confront difficult = foreign policy=20 choices they may wish to avoid.

Sino-Saudi Relations: Broad-Based Engagement

Many Saudi officials, annoyed with U.S. pressure to cease = funding=20 Islamist and terrorist groups, find Beijing's no-questions-asked = policies=20 attractive. Beijing and Riyadh are in one key way alike, in that = both seek=20 to take advantage of economic globalization without endangering = their=20 political status quo.

That Beijing was the first stop on King Abdullah's Asian tour=20 symbolized China's growing profile. The Chinese government has = worked hard=20 to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest = oil=20 exporter.[2] In 2004, the = two countries=20 inaugurated a series of regular political consultations. That same = year,=20 China's state oil company, Sinopec, signed a deal to explore gas = in Saudi=20 Arabia's vast Empty Quarter (Rub al-Khali). Then, in December = 2005,=20 Beijing held its first formal talks with the Organization of = Petroleum=20 Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Reflective of the growing breadth of Sino-Saudi relations, = Abdullah=20 used his visit not only to sign a pact on energy cooperation and = joint=20 investment in oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits but also to = conclude=20 broader economic, trade, taxation, and technical accords, a = vocational=20 training agreement, and to finalize a Saudi Arabian Development = Bank urban=20 development loan for the historic Muslim Chinese city of Aksu in = the=20 western province of Xinjiang.[3]

Still, energy is the backbone of the relationship. Until 1993, = China=20 was a net oil exporter,[4] = but it has=20 since become the second-greatest oil consumer after the United = States.=20 More than half of Chinese oil imports originate in the Persian = Gulf with=20 15 percent in Saudi Arabia. Total Saudi-Chinese trade grew 59 = percent in=20 2005 to US$14 billion and may reach $40 billion in the next four = to five=20 years.[5] By 2010, the = Middle East=20 might account for 95 percent of China's imported oil.[6]

Saudi Arabia has also emerged as a major investor in Chinese=20 refineries. In 1999, Saudi Arabia's Aramco Overseas Company = provided a=20 $750 million investment=9725 percent of the total project=97in a = petrochemical=20 complex in Fujian capable of processing 8 million tons of Saudi = crude oil=20 per annum. Saudi Arabia, in cooperation with several members of = OPEC,=20 intends to build a new refinery in Guangzhou involving a total = investment=20 of $8 billion.[7]

Sino-Saudi trade and investment will only increase. During his = trip,=20 Abdullah invited Chinese businessmen to invest in Saudi Arabia and = take=20 advantage of the kingdom's economic reforms and privatization of = some=20 state-owned firms. Beijing and Riyadh plan to expand bilateral = investments=20 with emphasis on energy, infrastructure, and telecommunications.[8] The Saudi government may = seek Chinese=20 assistance as it works towards diversifying its economy.

Already, Saudi Arabia is China's biggest trading partner in the = greater=20 Middle East, and China is Saudi Arabia's fourth-largest importer = and fifth=20 largest exporter while Saudi Arabia is China's tenth-largest = importer and=20 largest crude oil supplier.[9]=20 Chinese industrial goods are increasingly displacing Western = products in=20 the Saudi markets, affecting Saudi attitudes towards the relative=20 importance of the United States and China. Such a trend may = accelerate if=20 Chinese government plans to sign a free trade agreement with the = Gulf=20 Cooperation Council come to fruition.[10] In the last two years, growing bilateral = trade has=20 led to three rounds of free trade area negotiations, most recently = in=20 January 2006.

The new economic symbiosis is having an increasing impact on = Saudi=20 Arabia's military and political posture. Riyadh once relied on = Washington=20 for its defense.[11] But=20 while Washington was a major military supplier, it was not the = only one.=20 Between 1990 and 1994, the Saudi Defense and Aviation Ministry = spent $50=20 billion purchasing military hardware, not only from the United = States but=20 also Great Britain, France, and China.[12]

In the 1980s, the kingdom sought to tap the Chinese arms = market. In=20 1985, the Saudi government risked Washington's ire to import = Chinese CSS-2=20 nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missiles with a=20 3,000-kilometer range. With the CSS-2 becoming obsolete, Riyadh is = considering purchase of the upgraded, solid-fuelled CSS-5 and = CSS-6 with a=20 range of 1800 and 600 kilometers respectively.[13]

It is not just the Saudi government that is happy to find an=20 alternative to its traditional dependence on Washington. Chinese=20 authorities are happy to provide a political and diplomatic = alternative=20 for states such as Saudi Arabia that are upset with U.S. pressure = to=20 curtail support for terrorism and perceived U.S. interference in = domestic=20 affairs. After all, Beijing and many Arab governments share = suspicions of=20 U.S. policy.[14] China's = president,=20 Hu Jintao, visited Riyadh in April 2006 and addressed the Shura, = the=20 consultative council that advises the king. It is an honor that = has been=20 granted to only a select few foreign leaders. The latest U.S. = National=20 Security Strategy declares the White House's belief that "the = fundamental=20 character of regimes matters as much as the distribution of power = among=20 the states" and reiterated Washington's goal "to help create a = world of=20 democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of = citizens and=20 conduct themselves responsibly in the international system."[15] Such objectives = threaten equally=20 the Chinese government and that of Saudi Arabia, which is=97with = Libya and=20 Syria=97among the most autocratic and arbitrary regimes in the = Arab Middle=20 East.[16] Many Arab = governments also=20 see Beijing's U.N. Security Council veto as an important = counterbalance to=20 U.S. hyper-power.[17]

Saudi-Indian Relations: Mutual Interests?

From China, King Abdullah flew to India, Asia's other emerging = giant,=20 where he was a guest of honor at India's national Republic Day=20 celebrations. It was the first visit of a Saudi monarch to India = since=20 King Saud's brief visit to the subcontinent in 1955. Relations=20 subsequently froze, as Riyadh sided with Washington during the = Cold War,=20 and New Delhi drifted closer to Moscow. Saudi-Indian ties strained = further=20 after the Indian government failed to condemn the 1979 Soviet = invasion of=20 Afghanistan while the Saudi government helped bankroll the = opposition=20 Afghan mujahideen.[18]=20 However, with the Cold War over, such impediments to Saudi-Indian=20 relations evaporated.

The two countries have significant interests beyond oil. While = India is=20 not a Muslim-majority country, it still hosts the second-largest = Muslim=20 population in the world,[19]=20 a constituency that remains interested in Saudi Arabia as the site = of the=20 holy shrines at Mecca and Medina. There is already significant = cultural=20 interchange. Approximately 1.5 million Indian workers constitute = the=20 largest expatriate community in the kingdom.[20]

Riyadh, for its part, has agreed to support New Delhi's = petition for=20 observer status in the Organization of Islamic Conference. It has = also=20 been supportive of Indian moves to reduce tension in Kashmir and = has tried=20 to move beyond its traditional approach of looking at India = through a=20 Pakistani prism.

New Delhi has also cultivated Riyadh for strategic reasons. To = Indian=20 strategists, any ally that can act as a counterweight to Pakistan = in the=20 Islamic world is significant. Initially, New Delhi sought to = cultivate=20 Tehran, but such efforts stumbled in recent years as the Islamic = Republic=20 has adopted an increasingly aggressive anti-Western posture.[21] Saudi Arabia now fills = that gap.=20 Indeed, Iranian nuclear ambitions have helped draw New Delhi and = Riyadh=20 closer.

The Saudi government has its own reasons for cultivating Indian = ties.=20 Saudi Arabia and Iran have long competed for power and influence = in the=20 Persian Gulf.[22] The = 1979 Islamic=20 Revolution in Iran added a new edge to the rivalry, as Iranian = ayatollahs=20 sought increasingly to challenge the Saudi officials on religious = matters,=20 such as the rules and regulations surrounding the hajj or = pilgrimage to=20 Mecca. The fact that about 40 percent of Saudi Arabia's = oil-producing=20 eastern province is Shi=91ite and resents Wahhabi rule worries = Riyadh.[23] The anxiety = is mutual. In=20 1994, the Iranian intelligence ministry designated Salafi = terrorism as the=20 primary threat to Iranian national security.[24] Tehran's nuclear drive, Iranian = interference in=20 neighboring Iraq, and Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's = aggressive=20 rhetoric further raise Saudi anxiety of a resurgent Iran, and all = were=20 subjects of discussion during the king's meeting with the Indian = prime=20 minister.[25]

Still, the relationship is not all rosy. The Indian military = has been=20 fighting separatist groups in its northern state of Kashmir for = several=20 years now. Thousands of lives have been lost because of Islamist = terrorism=20 or the associated crackdown. Saudi financiers bankroll many of the = Pakistani and Kashmiri groups that conduct the terrorism.[26] The Indian government = would like=20 its Saudi counterparts to manage the funds transferred to India = better, a=20 substantial portion of which ends in Islamist pockets. The Indian = prime=20 minister and Saudi king used their New Delhi meeting to sign a = memorandum=20 of understanding dealing with terrorism, transnational crime, and=20 underworld operations.[27]=20 Both governments agreed to cooperate toward the conclusion of a=20 comprehensive convention on international terrorism before the = U.N.=20 General Assembly and to establish an international = counterterrorism center=20 as called for by the International Conference on Counter-Terrorism = held in=20 Riyadh in February 2005.[28]

While the Indian government would like political reforms to = take hold=20 in Saudi Arabia to mitigate the Islamist threat,[29] energy is now the driving force in = Saudi-Indian=20 relations. Riyadh is the chief supplier of oil to India's booming = economy,=20 and India is now the fourth largest recipient of Saudi oil after = China,=20 the United States, and Japan.[30]=20 India's crude oil imports from the Saudi kingdom will likely = double in the=20 next twenty years.[31] = During his=20 visit to India, the Saudi king emphasized his country's commitment = to=20 uninterrupted supplies to a friendly country such as India = regardless of=20 global price trends.[32]

As with Saudi Arabia and China, energy infrastructure = investment is a=20 major component in the development of Saudi-Indian relations. = During the=20 state visit, King Abdullah and Indian prime minister Manmohan = Singh signed=20 an Indo-Saudi "Delhi Declaration" calling for a wide-ranging = strategic=20 partnership, putting energy and economic cooperation on overdrive, = and=20 committing to cooperate against terrorism.[33] According to some reports, the king = waived off=20 Saudi bureaucratic concerns about precedents the declaration might = create=20 with regard to its relations with India's neighbors, especially = Pakistan,=20 by calling India a "special case." [34]

The private Indian energy firm Reliance will invest in a = refinery and=20 petrochemicals project in Saudi Arabia, and India's state-owned = energy=20 firm, Oil and Energy Gas Corporation, will also engage Saudi = Arabia as its=20 equity partner for a refinery project in the Indian state of = Andhra=20 Pradesh.[35] The Iranian = government's=20 decision to renege on some oil supply commitments in the aftermath = of=20 India's vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy = Agency (IAEA)=20 has also spurred New Delhi to diversify suppliers. There are more = than 100=20 Indian joint ventures in Saudi Arabia and about half that number = of Saudi=20 joint ventures in India.[36] As the=20 king visited New Delhi, close to eighty top Saudi businessmen = participated=20 in the first "Saudi Arabia in India" business exhibition. A new=20 Saudi-India Joint Business Council will provide an institutional = framework=20 to expand bilateral economic ties. Saudi authorities hope that = such a=20 channel can tap Indian expertise and help it diversify its economy = in=20 fields ranging from information technology and biotechnology to = education=20 and small business development.

Geopolitical Impediments

While Riyadh might welcome its upgraded relations with both = Beijing and=20 New Delhi, constraints might limit future expansion of their ties. = Sino-Indian energy competition may force an unpalatable choice = upon Saudi=20 officials. And once Washington is thrown into the mix, the picture = becomes=20 more complicated. With the United States viewing China as its = greatest=20 future challenge[37] and = Washington=20 working actively to bolster U.S.-Indian ties,[38] joint pressures upon Riyadh will only = build. U.S.=20 officials are already concerned that Beijing's outreach to the = Middle East=20 has undercut nonproliferation efforts and challenged U.S. = standing.[39]

Riyadh's close relationship to Islamabad will also constrain = its=20 relations with India. Pakistan not only receives oil from Saudi = Arabia at=20 discounted rates, but there remains speculation that Saudi = interests=20 underwrote Pakistan's nuclear program and missile purchases,[40] presumably to allow = Saudi Arabia=20 ready access to nuclear and ballistic missile technology if the = need=20 arose. Pressure has increased on Saudi Arabia to open its nuclear=20 facilities as the IAEA suspects that Pakistani nuclear cooperation = has=20 advanced Saudi Arabia's program to a level warranting = international=20 safeguards.[41] = Washington also wants=20 Riyadh to provide unhindered access to its nuclear facilities. The = Saudis=20 argue that they would do so only if other states=97Israel=97do the = same.[42]

Saudi authorities may also be uncomfortable with improvements = in=20 Chinese and Indian relations with Israel.[43] Neither Beijing nor New Delhi may accept = Saudi=20 pressure to downgrade their relationship to Jerusalem; = unwillingness to=20 compromise on their antagonism toward the Jewish state may pose a = quandary=20 for hard-line Saudi officials. Nor will Riyadh enjoy a monopoly = over=20 outreach to the two Asian giants. Despite recent tension in = Indo-Iranian=20 relations, Indian officials insist that the 1,625-mile, = $4.16-billion=20 pipeline project to transport gas from Iran through Pakistan to = India=20 remains on track.[44]=20 Chinese firms have also increased their investment in Iran.[45]

A more significant impediment, especially with regard to India, = is the=20 proliferation of Saudi-funded religious schools in the country. = The Salafi=20 movement has taken advantage of India's liberal environment and = Muslim=20 unease with resurgent Hindu nationalism to preach radicalism to = India's=20 130-million strong Muslim populace.

A madrasa (Islamic school) education in India has long = been a=20 part of many Muslim children's lives. Madrasas in India = number=20 between 8,000 and 40,000.[46] But=20 concerns have been rising in India about the dated and, with Saudi = financing, increasingly radical curricula. In 2001, a report of = the Group=20 of Ministers on "Reforming the National Security System" = recommended the=20 need to modernize madrasa education.[47]

Saudi financial assistance has gone to a range of = Indian-Islamic=20 organizations resulting in the establishment of mosques, = madrasas,=20 and publishing houses inculcating the Saudi worldview.[48] Riyadh also provides = scholarships=20 to Indian students to study religion in its universities. These=20 Saudi-educated imams often return and preach Salafi ideology to = unemployed=20 and susceptible Indian Muslims.[49] Some of the returning Indians also = transfer funds=20 to local Islamic institutions, often through the hawala = system in=20 which no records of individual transactions are produced.[50]

The Ahle-Hadith (People of the Tradition of the Prophet), a = Sunni=20 Islamic sect with ties to the Saudi state dating back to the = 1920s, has=20 arguably been the biggest beneficiary of Saudi monetary assistance = contributing to internecine rivalries among various Indian Muslim = sects.[51] Several Indian = madrasas that=20 follow the Ahle-Hadith tradition have begun to emphasize their = closeness=20 with the Saudi Salafis. While the early Ahle-Hadith was in many = ways=20 progressive, it has now altered into an intolerant, literalist = strand.

Several Indian Islamic jurists and scholars seem to have = gravitated=20 towards this Saudi-sanctioned, radical interpretation of Islam and = to a=20 conspiratorial version of global politics. Instructive in this = context is=20 a claim made by a Muslim jurist from the Deoband sect in India = that "should it be proved that Osama was the mastermind behind = the=20 attacks of September 11, he would not be punished under Islamic = law since=20 his actions were the result of an independent, legal opinion = issued by top=20 jurists."[52] Another = Islamic=20 scholar from a prominent seminary in north India has argued that = "a=20 worldwide anti-Muslim alliance has been formed and is headed by = the U.S.=20 It runs in an arc from Hindu fundamentalist India, through China = and=20 Russia, and ends with Europe and the U.S. in the west. The effect = is to=20 encircle and choke the Islamic world."[53]

Terrorism will brake Saudi relations with both Asian powers. = New Delhi=20 and Riyadh differ over the definition of terrorism. Most Arab = states,=20 including Saudi Arabia, argue in the context of the = Israeli-Palestinian=20 conflict that liberation struggles justify acts of terror; the = Indian=20 government categorically opposes terrorist attacks on civilians. = The two=20 states had intended to sign a mutual legal assistance treaty on = criminal=20 matters during the king's visit. Such a treaty usually serves as a = precursor to an extradition treaty. But, unable to break the = impasse, the=20 two sides' diplomats could only agree to a watered-down memorandum = of=20 understanding on combating crime.[54]=20 New Delhi is especially sensitive given Saudi links to jihadi = groups such=20 as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have staged attacks within India.[55] The group has tried to = recruit=20 Indian Muslims=97so far with only limited success=97for its = radical causes=20 from the Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia and other states in the = Persian=20 Gulf. It has been claimed that, despite the best efforts of = Lashkar, it=20 has not been very successful in wooing Muslim youth in India.[56]

The Chinese government's autocratic character has retarded the = spread=20 of Salafism in China, relative to the traction extremists have = found in=20 the more permissive Indian society.[57] There are approximately twenty million = Muslims in=20 China and more than 40,000 Islamic places of worship, at least = half of=20 which are in the northwestern province of Xinjiang[58] where Chinese = repression is severe.=20 Not only does the state censor sermons, but Chinese officials also = ask=20 imams to focus on the damage caused to Islam by terrorism in the = name of=20 religion.[59] = Chinese=20 authorities often charge practicing Muslims there with incitement, = separatism, and Islamic extremism. There has been some evidence of = small=20 numbers of Chinese-Muslim Uighurs fighting with Al-Qaeda in = Afghanistan=20 with a few even incarcerated at Guantanamo.[60] But even if Chinese authorities conflate = religion=20 with Uighur separatism, they still acknowledge that separatist = activities=20 have decreased in recent years.[61]

Nevertheless, Chinese oppression of eight million ethnic Uighur = Sunnis=20 not to mention other Chinese Muslims may complicate its future=20 relationship with Saudi officials. Uighur grievances are unlikely = to=20 dissipate.[62] As = Sino-Saudi ties=20 expand, Saudi religious activists may draw parallels between = Xinjiang and=20 the West Bank, Gaza, and Kashmir.

Conclusion

It is simplistic to assume that Saudi Arabia is fashioning its = foreign=20 policy only in opposition to that of the United States. = Nevertheless, the=20 9-11 terrorist attacks and the U.S.-led war on terror caused both = Riyadh=20 and Washington to reevaluate their "special relationship." It is = in this=20 context that Riyadh has begun courting an Asian alternative. = Riyadh's=20 relations with Beijing and New Delhi are on an upward swing as a=20 consequence of shifting global political and economic realities = and are=20 unlikely to alter as a result of a change in Saudi leadership.

The prospects for a tight Sino-Saudi relationship, however, are = rosier=20 than a future Indo-Saudi relationship. Simply put, the threat of = Islamism=20 and friction between autocratic Saudi Arabia and democratic India = are too=20 great. This may create complications in the long-term but in the=20 near-term, Saudi Arabia's "look east" policy is firmly on track, = and the=20 United States will have to configure its foreign policy = accordingly.

Harsh V. Pant is a lecturer in the defense studies = department=20 at King's College, London.

[1] International Herald Tribune, Jan. 26, = 2006.
[2] Jin = Liangxiang, "Energy First: China = and the=20 Middle East," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp.=20 3-10.
[3] "China, Saudi = Arabia Forge=20 Closer Relationship," China Daily (Beijing), Jan. 24, = 2006.
[4] Matthew Forney, "China's = Quest for=20 Oil," Time, Oct. 25, 2004.
[5] Associated Press, Jan. 23, 2006.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Financial Times (London), Jan. 24, = 2006.
[8] Hindustan = Times (New=20 Delhi), Jan. 24, 2005.
[9]=20 The New York Times, Apr. 23, 2006.
[10] China Daily, July 7, 2004.
[11] Rachel Bronson, = Thicker than=20 Oil: America's Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (New York: = Oxford=20 University Press, 2006), pp. 56-60.
[12] Ibid., p. 207.
[13] Dan Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China = and the=20 Middle East," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp.=20 11-9.
[14] = Arab=20 News (Jeddah), May 2, 2006.
[15] The National=20 Security Strategy of the United States of America, White = House,=20 Mar. 2006, p. 1.
[16] = Saliba=20 Sarsar, "Democracy = in the=20 Middle East: Quantifying Arab Democracy," Middle East=20 Quarterly, Summer 2006, pp. 21-8.
[17] Arab News (Jeddah), May 2, = 2006.
[18] P.R. Mudiam, India = and the=20 Middle East (London: British Academic Press, 1994), pp. = 85-97.
[19] Detailed statistics can = be found at=20 "Census of India," Ta= ble=20 1: Total Population, Government of India, Ministry of Home=20 Affairs.
[20] Divya = Pakkiasamy,=20 "Saudi=20 Arabia's Plan for Changing Its Workforce," Migration = Information=20 Service, Nov. 1, 2004.
[21] See=20 Harsh V. Pant, "India and Iran: An =91Axis' in the Making," = Asian=20 Survey, May/June 2004, pp. 369-83.
[22] R.K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran: = Challenge and=20 Response in the Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins = University=20 Press, 1986), pp. 8-11.
[23] Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia = Enters the=20 Twenty-First Century: The Political, Foreign Policy, and Energy=20 Dimensions (London: Praeger, 2003), p. 206.
[24] Mahan Abedin, "The Iranian Intelligence = Services and=20 the War on Terror," Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown = Foundation, May=20 20, 2004.
[25] Indian=20 Express (New Delhi), Jan. 24, 2006.
[26] Husain Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South = Asian Jihadi=20 Groups," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 1, pp. = 23-4; J.=20 Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, Alms for Jihad = (Cambridge:=20 Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 26-50.
[27] The Hindu = (Chennai, Madras),=20 Jan. 26, 2006.
[28] = "Final Report=20 of the Counter-= Terrorism=20 International Conference," Riyadh, Feb. 5-8, 2005.
[29] The Indian = Express (New=20 Delhi), Jan. 24, 2006.
[30] The Hindu Business Line (Chennai), = Mar. 29,=20 2005.
[31] = Ibid.
[32] Hindustan = Times,=20 Jan. 25, 2006.
[33] = "Delhi Declaration," = Joint=20 Declarations and Statements, Ministry of External Affairs, New = Delhi,=20 India, Jan. 27, 2006.
[34] The Tribune (New Delhi), Jan. 27, = 2006.
[35] Arab = News, Jan. 6,=20 2005.
[36] = Press Trust of=20 India news agency, Jan. 21, 2006.
[37] "Quadrennial Defense= =20 Review Report 2006," U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 6, 2006, = pp.=20 29-30; Richard R. Russell, "Oil for Missiles," The Wall Street=20 Journal, Jan. 25, 2006.
[38]=20 "President Discusses = Strong=20 U.S.-India Partnership in New Delhi, India," White House news = release,=20 Mar. 3, 2006.
[39] = Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China = and the=20 Middle East."
[40] = Thomas=20 Woodrow, "The Sino-Saudi Connection," China Brief, = Jamestown=20 Foundation, Oct. 24, 2002.
[41]=20 Paul Kerr, "IA= EA=20 Board Seeks Strengthened Safeguards," Arms Control = Today,=20 July/Aug. 2005.
[42]=20 Ibid.
[43] On = Sino-Israeli ties,=20 see P.R. Kumaraswamy, "At=20 What Cost Israel-China Ties?" Middle East Quarterly, = Spring=20 2006, pp. 37-44; Dan Blumenthal, "Providing Arms: China = and the=20 Middle East," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. = 11-9. On=20 India-Israel ties, see Harsh V. Pant, "India-Israel Partnership:=20 Convergence and Constraints," Middle East Review of = International=20 Affairs, Dec. 2004, pp. 60-73.
[44] Associated Foreign Press, Feb. 24, = 2006.
[45] Financial Times, = Jan. 4,=20 2006.
[46] Amir Ullah = Khan,=20 Mohammad Sadiq and Zafar H. Anjum, "= To=20 Kill the Mockingbird," India China Economic and Cultural = Centre, New=20 Delhi, accessed June 28, 2006.
[47] "Reforming = the National=20 Security System=97Recommendations of the Group of Ministers," = Feb. 19,=20 2001.
[48] Yoginder = Sikand, "Intra-Muslim=20 Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection," Jamia Hamdard=20 University, accessed June 28, 2006.
[49] Pakkiasamy, "Saudi=20 Arabia's Plan for Changing Its Workforce."
[50] Haqqani, "The Ideologies of South Asian = Jihadi=20 Groups."
[51] Sikand, = "Intra-Muslim=20 Rivalries in India and the Saudi Connection."
[52] Quoted in Bernard Haykel, "The Silence of = Moderate=20 Muslims," The Dawn (Karachi), Dec. 5, 2002.
[53] Ibid.
[54] "What's Terror? India, Saudi Differ," = Hindustan=20 Times, Jan. 27, 2006.
[55] G.=20 Parthasarthy, "Saudi-Pakistani Nexus on Terrorism," The = Tribune,=20 Sept. 25, 2003; Husain Haqqani, "India's Islamist Groups," = Current=20 Trends in Islamist Ideology, vol. 3, pp. 10-23.
[56] B. Raman, "Al-Qaeda, the IIF = and=20 Indian Muslims," International Terrorism Monitor, South = Asia=20 Analysis Group, paper no.1743 (34), Mar. 20, 2006.
[57] "Devastating Blows: Religious Repressi= on=20 of Uighurs in Xinjiang," Human Rights Watch, Apr. 2005, p. = 12.
[58] "China=20 (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau)," International = Religious=20 Freedom Report 2005, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and = Labor,=20 U.S. State Department, Nov. 8, 2005.
[59] Ibid.
[60]=20 Ibid, p. 8.; Paul Wiseman, "China Equates Muslim Rebels with = Terrorists,"=20 USA Today, June 20, 2002; The Washington Post, Dec. = 15,=20 2005.
[61] "China,"=20 International Religious Freedom Report 2005.
[62] Igor Rotar, "The = Growing Problem of=20 Uighur Separatism," China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, Apr. = 15,=20 2004.

To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East=20 Quarterly, please see details about an affordable subscriptio= n.

Printer-friendly version

Related Items

 

To=20 unsubscribe from the MEF News list, go to http://www.meforum.org/un= subscribe.php
To=20 subscribe to the MEF News list, go to http://www.meforum.org/subs= cribe.php
To=20 receive alerts of MEF staff media appearances, please sign up for = the=20 MEF Alerts mailing list at: http://www.meforum.org/subs= cribe.php

You=20 may freely forward this information, but on condition that you = send the=20 text as an integral whole along with complete information about = its=20 author, date, and source.

  ------=_NextPart_001_0032_01C6EBB8.328D03D0-- ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: image/gif; name="blank.gif" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://www.meforum.org/img/blank.gif R0lGODlhAQABAJH/AP///wAAAP///wAAACH5BAEAAAIALAAAAAABAAEAAAICVAEAOw== ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: image/gif; name="logo.gif" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://www.meforum.org/img/logo.gif R0lGODlhigAvAMT/AP77/PPx8uLf6dDL4Ofm7qCdyK+t0cLB2jExmE5OonR0tYeHwN3d7fX1+fn5 ++zt8+Ll8u7x+ccdHdRPT910dOaXl+yxsfDDw/TU1Pji4vrs7P319cDAwAAAAAAAAAAAACH5BAEA ABwALAAAAACKAC8AQAX/ICeOZGmeaKqubOu+cIw2CWLfyfMK9W0nDNlpU5FMMiQNxahhFS0njYQi skgqQlVD4et6EQUT7UtGLAAchyxDaXKWFxFGIkEClki4aLOEXqZoHFYUaFZYGUZIHBsYGy4OXGWS Pgs9k5MJAjATVxd4I1YWGYMAShYYE1hWExYXjlkrEZGXkgcpDLSXCiqjFxgXFsGiKYGlI4gTsCmQ uZIDQgbNziecfqJGJMhvEnEif1RVVyJLGOFYHBoTE6/KKdFmsAs2Z+319vclB5fPKvqTBu1GCcKm oUIGRHXGSdAAgJMiDk8gSoAiAhE4QxzmULjAkVwMf9JuKGjAAWRIBCNh/2j4c+UghgpHMhSZ2Ahf uwgBGujcybOnzwYRIqgRAaDAyS8AW1QjASDDBj4UMNxJuMiKBAxSktkkweDAgK9gw4ode+CAphYO LB39ESDFUg1SRcDFEJdDBgxIftHFKsdXhqZ4m3J0dPfCwxMDEihezLix48ULhsJi8LiyZTAjPNFh 5YaDpwoXKlDIy2n0CJigOU6IeoFThQ1spkgtwirQVhFd2xlIeru37xYA5ImU7GKLDwVt62meUK4E Ktl/1pUAYGGp8yVUYp/rjYtMJhcBCAQI8KD8AwI66vViUhE0Jw0bqk9w07qCBdET5VKgcL/IRXEc UMdfBa/BElwuvE03y/8kYcAyChr+gZYRHYosAdcUJETk0DEYDoSFHu0QcBQ9IjQg3ngopqjieAQQ IAMjrZyyAQDszLEQAMC04sZ9vuA4TEb2XQAABq0QGUxzGtx3igxGrWWDAgselUAEMVjH0FNPBQjf dLYJaNtvuDnpQxAcRLkWP0rlh4FpRI3wnFN0sKkNmCI0KSaJJLwjJma8sDSBL79QsE4RFfxSDUx4 VZdBVmASoJaUZKbwwKNHKUAcUxtUQyMjbLoAAG1R2VTUnnx6KpyYQKDg2iCepbKHoH8t8VoGwHQo ERZTUeSfIxp9WcKkeyZAUhYmOZmgCJx0E6CFmWEIome2EqqQIn+ck47/dHRmq+223Hbr7bdbJJCc EI5+9+25ygCLQAJowjCAD7bYc9eiJ5Qy7wa+nEDrj0lwVM5KS4L5bhfxvqDnDcdmMSQd251GRxxs VODrIn2YsDA40voGwME+NNiCUY6VqkySspJw34YA0Njlop/mR5QGTllkDgmwsaMMAGZSMrEJBhSw 288FBB30pWtYkKnL9yGExNFIVCtXsouo44Z/M396RNQU2BxDBJR6YWkKPFySgzICHU0XFjZWuNCc Imh4FYf/YUHoLxy5ksXAtIxtQrGSJOBiFg/aVRoaaSsEsxHsFBGHRxV1iFHGuoVk7ggELGD55Zhn voACBRDdwppXNLGm/5t0MNTaRBso8SeR/iGB2tnJKiFbq6sHs7MKOJ9JVCUJQMmYApYp1u7nBNoX jGgVNJEBJ1qje4K6ax0whpMFvwA1UYV6sp99ndXrVLd4k7qnxy5ALVNnQwLDvVzClLNKj9luTKql 4Tu5wCZTVPd224Qgu9AcUPjFImxFJwcYAEoITKACF5hA3kBAfF9LE0W+R4LQ6I80DEMHNrIFCQZ6 8IN/GwH0nOQ3CSYheUUoR0PWRpE/WIBRdKqflNJTAmYE6ywoeMl+KGA85Nlle77YjwXvUw62+cZO TlLA7URwKjFVrwQyiVN/1NE8FTAqdUtUWAMeEJQuevGLYIzAAyAAgcEsioBja0kYCazjjcO44C5m FMII1xJCFnRnfG7Jz30c8ZnQhAoVf5IPdrzhGhypI0arAYYnmGNHUiXAcyp4gPgiQ40roCJr72kW FSomB1thZBvNcRo6qNgPUt1PCFyb37DWmB8aGVEbz/oGKADEuE9eq4ppaGL0lGFDVNXxaA1DxTn4 cLVnIQMNsssaKGemQWyZgAAMiKY0p0nNakpzlemypja3iUNa7aUmI5gLOO9CF/TpRXmLIqdUGFFO wATGBCEAADs= ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0 Content-Type: image/gif; name="printerfriendly.gif" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Location: http://www.meforum.org/img/printerfriendly.gif R0lGODlhHQARAJEAAP////v3/8vA0XV1fCwAAAAAHQARAAACQoSPqcvtD6MZtNoqZ9i8h5EBw3dV Xzh6HpiNJbWxUqpy8mPWNuwMgvAq/W4K3++ITA57yiaSmDA6m9BoMBgIabeSAgA7 ------=_NextPart_000_0031_01C6EBB8.328D03D0--