Reply-To: "Pointer" From: "Pointer" To: "Pointer @LittleHornArchive.com" Subject: Of Mosques, Oil Fields and Ports Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2006 11:47:10 -0800 Organization: LittleHornArchive.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0041_01C63EB8.34DFBAE0"; type="multipart/alternative" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.2670 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2670 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0041_01C63EB8.34DFBAE0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0042_01C63EB8.34DFBAE0" ------=_NextPart_001_0042_01C63EB8.34DFBAE0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Stratfor.comServicesSubscriptionsReportsPartnersPress RoomContact = UsGEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT02.28.2006 =20 READ MORE... Analyses =20 Country Profiles - Archive =20 Forecasts =20 Geopolitical Diary =20 Global Market Brief - Archive =20 Hotspots - Archive =20 Intelligence Guidance =20 Net Assessment =20 Situation Reports =20 Special Reports =20 Strategic Markets - Archive =20 Stratfor Weekly =20 Terrorism Brief =20 Terrorism Intelligence Report =20 Travel Security - Archive =20 US - IRAQ War Coverage Of Mosques, Oil Fields and Ports By George Friedman Last week was dominated by three apparently discrete events. The = al-Askariyah mosque -- a significant Shiite shrine in As Samarra, Iraq = -- was bombed, triggering intensifying violence between Shiite and Sunni = groups. A group linked to al Qaeda claimed responsibility for attacking = a major oil facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. And a furor broke out in = the United States over the proposed purchase, by a government-owned = United Arab Emirates (UAE) firm, of a British company that operates a = number of important American ports. Apart from the fact that all of = these incidents involve Muslims, the stories don't appear to be linked. = They are. All three stories are commentaries on three things. First, they are = measures of the current state of the U.S.-jihadist war. Second, they are = measures of the Bush administration's strategy of splitting the Islamic = world against itself, along its natural fault lines, and using that = split to contain and control the radical Islamist threat against the = United States. And finally, they are the measure of U.S. President = George W. Bush's ability to manage public perceptions of his plans and = operations. The Fault Lines in Iraq Begin with the bombing of al-Askariyah, or "the Golden Mosque," in As = Samarra.=20 After the failures of U.S. intelligence and operations in Iraq in spring = 2003, the United States adopted a long-term strategy of using the = natural split between the country's Shiite and Sunni populations to = first stabilize its own position, and then improve it. During the first = phase, Washington tilted heavily toward the Shia, doing everything = possible to assure that there would be no Shiite rising to accompany = that of the Sunnis. Since the Shia had no love for the Sunni minority, = given their experiences under Saddam Hussein's anti-Shiite regime, this = was not overly difficult. In addition, the Shia were able to take = advantage of the U.S.-Sunni war to shape and dominate post-Hussein = politics. The Shia and Americans suited each other. In the second phase of this policy, the United States reached out to the = Sunnis, trying to draw them into a Shiite-Kurdish government. Washington = had two goals: One was a Sunni counterweight to the Shia. Whatever it = had promised the Shia, Washington did not simply want to hand Iraq over = to them, out of fear that the country would become an Iranian satellite = state. The second goal was to exploit fault lines within the Sunni = community itself, in order to manipulate the balance of power in favor = of the United States. By the time this phase of the policy was being implemented -- at the end = of the first battle of Al Fallujah, in 2004 -- the U.S.-Sunni war had = developed a new dimension, consisting of jihadists. These were Sunnis, = but differed from the Iraqi Sunnis in a number of critical ways. First, = many were foreigners who lacked roots in Iraq. Second, the Sunni = community in Iraq was multidimensional; Sunnis had been the backbone of = support for Hussein's regime, which had been far more secular than = Islamist. The jihadists, of course, were radical Islamists. Thus, there = was the potential for yet another rift; the stronger the jihadists grew, = the greater the risk to the traditional leadership of Iraq's Sunnis. The = jihadists might increase their influence within the community, = marginalizing the old leadership.=20 The U.S. success in manipulating this split reached a high point in = December 2005, with Iraq's national elections. The jihadists opposed = Sunni participation in the election, but the Sunni leadership = participated anyway. The jihadists threatened the leadership but could = not strike; as foreigners, they depended on local Sunni communities to = sustain and protect them. If they alienated the Sunni leadership without = destroying them, the jihadists would in turn be destroyed.=20 Thus, after the disaster in December, the jihadists embarked on a = different course. Rather than focusing on American forces or Shiite = collaborators, the goal was to trigger a civil war between the Shia and = Sunnis. The brilliantly timed attack on the Golden Mosque, much like the = 9/11 attacks, was intended to ignite a war. There would be an event that = the Shia could not ignore and to which they would respond with maximum = violence, preferably against the Sunnis as a whole. In an all-out civil = war, the Sunni leadership would not be able to dispense with the = jihadists, or so the jihadists hoped. Their own position would be = cemented and the Americans would be trapped in a country torn by civil = war. The Sunni leadership, of course, understands the situation. If the = Sunnis protect the jihadists who carried out the attack -- and we are = convinced they were jihadists -- they will be in a civil war they cannot = win. Given their numbers compared to the Shiite majority, the Sunnis -- = if they were to break with the Shia -- eventually would have to come = back to the table and make some sort of a deal. The jihadists are = betting that the terms the Shia would impose would be so harsh that the = Sunnis would prefer civil war. The United States has an interest in = limiting what terms the Shia can impose, and the Iraqi Shia themselves = understand that if there is civil war, they will need Iran's help. = Getting caught between the United States and Iran is not in their = interest.=20 There is, interestingly, the possibility of what passes for peace in = Iraq embedded in all of this. The jihadists, marginalized and desperate = due to American maneuvers, have tossed up a "Hail Mary" in the hope of = disrupting the works. It is certainly possible that the maneuver will = work. But a more reasonable assumption is that the bombing of the Golden = Mosque achieves merely a shift in the time frame the Sunnis thought they = had for negotiations. What might have taken months now could take much = less. Certainly, the Sunnis have been forced to a decision point.=20 Attempt at Strategic Attack The al Qaeda attack against the Abqaiq facility has similar roots. Prior to 2003, the Saudi position on al Qaeda was one of benign neglect. = The Saudi regime tried to limit both its exposure to the American war = against the jihadists, and to intelligence cooperation with the United = States, out of fear of the consequences from al Qaeda. After the = invasion of Iraq, however, and the realization that the United States = was rampaging just to the north, the Saudis shifted their position, and = significant intelligence cooperation began. There were two consequences = of this shift: One, the United States was receiving Saudi intelligence = and became much more effective than before in blocking al Qaeda attacks = and disrupting their operations; and two, the jihadists went to war = against the Saudi regime, launching a series of strikes and = counterstrikes over the next two years. The United States had split the = Saudi government off from the jihadists, and the Saudis absorbed the = price of collaboration. Al Qaeda has been relatively quiet in Saudi Arabia since June 2004. It = had appeared to many observers that al Qaeda was finished in Saudi = Arabia. Thus, just as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's faction in Iraq had to = assert itself or be marginalized, the al Qaeda faction in Saudi Arabia = had to demonstrate its continued capability to mount operations -- = however dangerous and difficult that task might be. It was Hail Mary = time in the kingdom as well. The result was the Feb. 24 attack against = Abqaiq, a critical oil processing facility.=20 This was intended to be a strategic attack. A strategic attack differs = from a tactical attack in several ways:=20 1. It shifts the political equation dramatically by demonstrating = capabilities.=20 2. It involves a strike against a target or resource that, if destroyed, = changes the economic or political scene definitively.=20 3. It requires a substantial commitment of resources.=20 The Sept. 11 strikes amounted to a strategic attack; a suicide bombing = by jihadists in Iraq normally does not. The Abqaiq operation was an = attempt at a strategic attack. It was designed to be a shocking = demonstration of al Qaeda's continued capabilities -- and to massively = affect world oil supplies. Such an operation would involve a great deal = of planning and, we suspect, a substantial proportion of trained and = available al Qaeda personnel in Saudi Arabia (as opposed to = sympathizers). But the strike was a fiasco. Rather than demonstrating al Qaeda's = capabilities in Saudi Arabia, the attackers barely penetrated the first = security cordon before they were gunned down by security forces. = Certainly, they demonstrated that al Qaeda still has operatives who are = willing to attempt a strategic attack, but they failed to demonstrate = that they still have the ability to actually execute one. Special = operations are always difficult, but it now appears that either the = group had been penetrated by Saudi security from the beginning, or the = cell was not trained in the arts that al Qaeda previously dominated. All = three cars used in the strike appear to have been identified and = destroyed before there was any possibility they could reach their = targets inside the Abqaiq compound.=20 In Iraq, two divisions in the Muslim world revealed themselves and were = manipulated. The first was the Sunni-Shiite split, the second was the = rift between the jihadists and mainstream Sunnis. In Saudi Arabia, the = split was between, on one side, the state apparatus and the leaders of = the royal family -- who had lost their ability to remain neutral in the = face of the Iraq invasion, U.S. bellicosity and the fear of a = U.S.-Iranian entente over Iraq -- and an increasingly radicalized = faction of the religious establishment that was supporting al Qaeda. = Within the kingdom, the latter could not withstand the weight of the = former, and the result showed itself last week, with a feeble al Qaeda = effort that was followed by bombastic rhetoric. The Debate on the Ports Deal The third dimension in all of this became apparent with the ports issue. = Washington has tried to draw a line between Muslim states that have = cooperated with the United States in due course -- regardless of what = their earlier behavior might have been like -- and those states that it = still doesn't trust. It distinguishes in this way between, for example, = Syria and Kuwait. The former has always been seen as hostile to the = United States, the latter has been a mainstay of American strategy since = its liberation by the United States in 1991. The rest of the Muslim = world is distributed along a continuum between these poles. Washington's only hope for something approaching a satisfactory outcome = in Iraq was to work with factions it never would have spoken to prior to = 2003. Its hope for a satisfactory outcome in the global war with the = jihadists was in getting Saudi intelligence to work with the United = States. That also required actions and compromises that would not have = been made before 2003. Finally, in order to reshape the Muslim world, = the United States needed to have relations with countries that did not = have immaculate records but which, on the whole and for a variety of = reasons, now found it in their interest to work with Washington.=20 For Saudi Arabia, the motivating factor was fear. For the UAE, it was = greed. To be more fair, the UAE is something like a Switzerland: Its = business is business, and it tilts its politics in such a way that = business is likely to be good. The Islamic world is a complex place, and = there are many players. If the United States is to be successful, it = must divide, manipulate and conquer that world along the lines of its = complexity. The Sunni-Shiite fault line is one axis, but the division = between countries that are motivated by mercenary considerations, as = opposed to those that have more complex motives, is another.=20 The UAE wants to do business, and it is good at it. One of its = businesses is managing ports. Purchasing a British company in the same = industry is a natural thing to do in business; the fact that the = purchase in question would give the UAE company oversight of ports in = the United States is another attraction of the deal. The attraction is = not that the UAE could facilitate the movement of al Qaeda operatives = into the United States; that is not what the UAE is after, since it = would be bad for business. What it is after is the profits that come = from doing the business.=20 Now, some argue that this business deal will make it easier for al Qaeda = operatives to get into the United States. We find that doubtful. Al = Qaeda operatives -- the real ones, not the wannabes -- if they are out = there, will get into the United States just fine by a number of means. = And if they try to slip a bomb into a container ship, it won't be one = sent from a Muslim country -- the level of scrutiny there is too high. = It would be from a place and under a flag that no one would suspect for = a moment, like Denmark. At any rate, given what it means to "operate a = port," the risk to the United States from having a British company = manage its ports is about the same as that from the UAE: Has anyone = noticed that holding a British passport these days is no guarantee of = loyalty to Western ideals? The Administration's Strategy The point here is not to argue the merits of the Dubai ports deal, but = rather to place the business deal in the context of the U.S. grand = strategy. That strategy is, again, to split the Islamic world into its = component parts, induce divisions by manipulating differences, and to = create coalitions based on particular needs. This is, currently, about = the only strategy the United States has going for it -- and if it can't = use commercial relations as an inducement in the Muslim world, that is = quite a weapon to lose.=20 The problem has become political, and stunningly so. One of the most = recent opinion polls, by CBS, has placed Bush's approval rating at 34 = percent -- a fairly shocking decline, and clearly attributable to the = port issue. As we have noted in the past, each party has a core = constituency of about 35-37 percent. When support falls significantly = below this level, a president loses his ability to govern.=20 The Republican coalition consists of three parts: social conservatives, = economic conservatives and business interests, and national security = conservatives. The port deal has apparently hit the national security = conservatives in Bush's coalition hard. They were already shaky over the = administration's personnel policies in the military and the question of = whether he had a clear strategy in Iraq, even as they supported the = invasion.=20 Another part of the national security faction consists of those who = believe that the Muslim world as a whole is, in the end, united against = the United States, and that it poses a clear and present danger. Bush = used to own this faction, but the debate over the ports has generated = serious doubts among this faction about Bush's general policy. In their = eyes, he appears inconsistent and potentially hypocritical. Economic = conservatives might love the ports deal, and so might conservatives of = the "realpolitik" variety, but those who buy into the view that there is = a general danger of terrorism emanating from all Muslim countries are = appalled -- and it is showing in the polls. If Bush sinks much lower, he will breaks into territory from which it = would be impossible for a presidency to recover. He is approaching this = territory with three years left in his presidency. It is the second time = that he has probed this region: The first was immediately after = Hurricane Katrina. He is now down deeper in the polls, and it is cutting = into his core constituency.=20 In effect, Bush's strategy and his domestic politics have intersected = with potential fratricidal force. The fact is that the U.S. strategy of = dividing the Muslim world and playing one part off against the other is = a defensible and sophisticated strategy -- even if does not, in the end, = turn out to be successful (and who can tell about that?) This is not the = strategy the United States started with; the strategy emerged out of the = failures in Iraq in 2003. But whatever its origins, it is the strategy = that is being used, and it is not a foolish strategy. The problem is that the political coalition has eroded to the point that = Bush needs all of his factions, and this policy -- particularly because = of the visceral nature of the ports issue -- is cutting into the heart = of his coalition. The general problem is this: The administration has = provided no framework for understanding the connection between a = destroyed mosque dome in As Samarra, an attack against a crucial oil = facility in Saudi Arabia, and the UAE buyout of a British = ports-management firm. Rather than being discussed in the light of a = single, integrated strategy, these appear to be random, disparate and = uncoordinated events. The reality of the administration's strategy and = the reality of its politics are colliding. Bush will backtrack on the = ports issue, and the UAE will probably drop the matter. But what is not = clear is whether the damage done to the strategy and the politics can be = undone. The numbers are just getting very low.=20 Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com. ------=_NextPart_001_0042_01C63EB8.34DFBAE0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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Stratfor.comServicesSubscriptionsReportsPartnersPress RoomContact Us
GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT
02.28.2006

Of Mosques, Oil Fields and Ports

By George=20 Friedman

Last week was dominated by three apparently discrete = events.=20 The al-Askariyah mosque -- a significant Shiite shrine in As Samarra, = Iraq --=20 was bombed, triggering intensifying violence between Shiite and Sunni = groups. A=20 group linked to al Qaeda claimed responsibility for attacking a major = oil=20 facility in Abqaiq, Saudi Arabia. And a furor broke out in the United = States=20 over the proposed purchase, by a government-owned United Arab Emirates = (UAE)=20 firm, of a British company that operates a number of important American = ports.=20 Apart from the fact that all of these incidents involve Muslims, the = stories=20 don't appear to be linked. They are.

All three stories are = commentaries=20 on three things. First, they are measures of the current state of the=20 U.S.-jihadist war. Second, they are measures of the Bush = administration's=20 strategy of splitting the Islamic world against itself, along its = natural fault=20 lines, and using that split to contain and control the radical Islamist = threat=20 against the United States. And finally, they are the measure of U.S. = President=20 George W. Bush's ability to manage public perceptions of his plans and=20 operations.

The Fault Lines in Iraq

Begin with the = bombing=20 of al-Askariyah, or "the Golden Mosque," in As Samarra.

After = the=20 failures of U.S. intelligence and operations in Iraq in spring 2003, the = United=20 States adopted a long-term strategy of using the natural split between = the=20 country's Shiite and Sunni populations to first stabilize its own = position, and=20 then improve it. During the first phase, Washington tilted heavily = toward the=20 Shia, doing everything possible to assure that there would be no Shiite = rising=20 to accompany that of the Sunnis. Since the Shia had no love for the = Sunni=20 minority, given their experiences under Saddam Hussein's anti-Shiite = regime,=20 this was not overly difficult. In addition, the Shia were able to take = advantage=20 of the U.S.-Sunni war to shape and dominate post-Hussein politics. The = Shia and=20 Americans suited each other.

In the second phase of this policy, = the=20 United States reached out to the Sunnis, trying to draw them into a=20 Shiite-Kurdish government. Washington had two goals: One was a Sunni=20 counterweight to the Shia. Whatever it had promised the Shia, Washington = did not=20 simply want to hand Iraq over to them, out of fear that the country = would become=20 an Iranian satellite state. The second goal was to exploit fault lines = within=20 the Sunni community itself, in order to manipulate the balance of power = in favor=20 of the United States.

By the time this phase of the policy was = being=20 implemented -- at the end of the first battle of Al Fallujah, in 2004 -- = the=20 U.S.-Sunni war had developed a new dimension, consisting of jihadists. = These=20 were Sunnis, but differed from the Iraqi Sunnis in a number of critical = ways.=20 First, many were foreigners who lacked roots in Iraq. Second, the Sunni=20 community in Iraq was multidimensional; Sunnis had been the backbone of = support=20 for Hussein's regime, which had been far more secular than Islamist. The = jihadists, of course, were radical Islamists. Thus, there was the = potential for=20 yet another rift; the stronger the jihadists grew, the greater the risk = to the=20 traditional leadership of Iraq's Sunnis. The jihadists might increase = their=20 influence within the community, marginalizing the old leadership. =

The=20 U.S. success in manipulating this split reached a high point in December = 2005,=20 with Iraq's national elections. The jihadists opposed Sunni = participation in the=20 election, but the Sunni leadership participated anyway. The jihadists = threatened=20 the leadership but could not strike; as foreigners, they depended on = local Sunni=20 communities to sustain and protect them. If they alienated the Sunni = leadership=20 without destroying them, the jihadists would in turn be destroyed. =

Thus,=20 after the disaster in December, the jihadists embarked on a different = course.=20 Rather than focusing on American forces or Shiite collaborators, the = goal was to=20 trigger a civil war between the Shia and Sunnis. The brilliantly timed = attack on=20 the Golden Mosque, much like the 9/11 attacks, was intended to ignite a = war.=20 There would be an event that the Shia could not ignore and to which they = would=20 respond with maximum violence, preferably against the Sunnis as a whole. = In an=20 all-out civil war, the Sunni leadership would not be able to dispense = with the=20 jihadists, or so the jihadists hoped. Their own position would be = cemented and=20 the Americans would be trapped in a country torn by civil = war.

The Sunni=20 leadership, of course, understands the situation. If the Sunnis protect = the=20 jihadists who carried out the attack -- and we are convinced they were = jihadists=20 -- they will be in a civil war they cannot win. Given their numbers = compared to=20 the Shiite majority, the Sunnis -- if they were to break with the Shia = --=20 eventually would have to come back to the table and make some sort of a = deal.=20 The jihadists are betting that the terms the Shia would impose would be = so harsh=20 that the Sunnis would prefer civil war. The United States has an = interest in=20 limiting what terms the Shia can impose, and the Iraqi Shia themselves=20 understand that if there is civil war, they will need Iran's help. = Getting=20 caught between the United States and Iran is not in their interest.=20

There is, interestingly, the possibility of what passes for = peace in=20 Iraq embedded in all of this. The jihadists, marginalized and desperate = due to=20 American maneuvers, have tossed up a "Hail Mary" in the hope of = disrupting the=20 works. It is certainly possible that the maneuver will work. But a more=20 reasonable assumption is that the bombing of the Golden Mosque achieves = merely a=20 shift in the time frame the Sunnis thought they had for negotiations. = What might=20 have taken months now could take much less. Certainly, the Sunnis have = been=20 forced to a decision point.

Attempt at Strategic=20 Attack

The al Qaeda attack against the Abqaiq facility has = similar=20 roots.

Prior to 2003, the Saudi position on al Qaeda was one of = benign=20 neglect. The Saudi regime tried to limit both its exposure to the = American war=20 against the jihadists, and to intelligence cooperation with the United = States,=20 out of fear of the consequences from al Qaeda. After the invasion of = Iraq,=20 however, and the realization that the United States was rampaging just = to the=20 north, the Saudis shifted their position, and significant intelligence=20 cooperation began. There were two consequences of this shift: One, the = United=20 States was receiving Saudi intelligence and became much more effective = than=20 before in blocking al Qaeda attacks and disrupting their operations; and = two,=20 the jihadists went to war against the Saudi regime, launching a series = of=20 strikes and counterstrikes over the next two years. The United States = had split=20 the Saudi government off from the jihadists, and the Saudis absorbed the = price=20 of collaboration.

Al Qaeda has been relatively quiet in Saudi = Arabia=20 since June 2004. It had appeared to many observers that al Qaeda was = finished in=20 Saudi Arabia. Thus, just as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's faction in Iraq had = to assert=20 itself or be marginalized, the al Qaeda faction in Saudi Arabia had to=20 demonstrate its continued capability to mount operations -- however = dangerous=20 and difficult that task might be. It was Hail Mary time in the kingdom = as well.=20 The result was the Feb. 24 attack against Abqaiq, a critical oil = processing=20 facility.

This was intended to be a strategic attack. A = strategic attack=20 differs from a tactical attack in several ways:

1. It shifts the = political equation dramatically by demonstrating capabilities. =

2. It=20 involves a strike against a target or resource that, if destroyed, = changes the=20 economic or political scene definitively.

3. It requires a = substantial=20 commitment of resources.

The Sept. 11 strikes amounted to a = strategic=20 attack; a suicide bombing by jihadists in Iraq normally does not. The = Abqaiq=20 operation was an attempt at a strategic attack. It was designed to be a = shocking=20 demonstration of al Qaeda's continued capabilities -- and to massively = affect=20 world oil supplies. Such an operation would involve a great deal of = planning=20 and, we suspect, a substantial proportion of trained and available al = Qaeda=20 personnel in Saudi Arabia (as opposed to sympathizers).

But the = strike=20 was a fiasco. Rather than demonstrating al Qaeda's capabilities in Saudi = Arabia,=20 the attackers barely penetrated the first security cordon before they = were=20 gunned down by security forces. Certainly, they demonstrated that al = Qaeda still=20 has operatives who are willing to attempt a strategic attack, but they = failed to=20 demonstrate that they still have the ability to actually execute one. = Special=20 operations are always difficult, but it now appears that either the = group had=20 been penetrated by Saudi security from the beginning, or the cell was = not=20 trained in the arts that al Qaeda previously dominated. All three cars = used in=20 the strike appear to have been identified and destroyed before there was = any=20 possibility they could reach their targets inside the Abqaiq compound.=20

In Iraq, two divisions in the Muslim world revealed themselves = and were=20 manipulated. The first was the Sunni-Shiite split, the second was the = rift=20 between the jihadists and mainstream Sunnis. In Saudi Arabia, the split = was=20 between, on one side, the state apparatus and the leaders of the royal = family --=20 who had lost their ability to remain neutral in the face of the Iraq = invasion,=20 U.S. bellicosity and the fear of a U.S.-Iranian entente over Iraq -- and = an=20 increasingly radicalized faction of the religious establishment that was = supporting al Qaeda. Within the kingdom, the latter could not withstand = the=20 weight of the former, and the result showed itself last week, with a = feeble al=20 Qaeda effort that was followed by bombastic rhetoric.

The = Debate on=20 the Ports Deal

The third dimension in all of this became = apparent=20 with the ports issue. Washington has tried to draw a line between Muslim = states=20 that have cooperated with the United States in due course -- regardless = of what=20 their earlier behavior might have been like -- and those states that it = still=20 doesn't trust. It distinguishes in this way between, for example, Syria = and=20 Kuwait. The former has always been seen as hostile to the United States, = the=20 latter has been a mainstay of American strategy since its liberation by = the=20 United States in 1991. The rest of the Muslim world is distributed along = a=20 continuum between these poles.

Washington's only hope for = something=20 approaching a satisfactory outcome in Iraq was to work with factions it = never=20 would have spoken to prior to 2003. Its hope for a satisfactory outcome = in the=20 global war with the jihadists was in getting Saudi intelligence to work = with the=20 United States. That also required actions and compromises that would not = have=20 been made before 2003. Finally, in order to reshape the Muslim world, = the United=20 States needed to have relations with countries that did not have = immaculate=20 records but which, on the whole and for a variety of reasons, now found = it in=20 their interest to work with Washington.

For Saudi Arabia, the = motivating=20 factor was fear. For the UAE, it was greed. To be more fair, the UAE is=20 something like a Switzerland: Its business is business, and it tilts its = politics in such a way that business is likely to be good. The Islamic = world is=20 a complex place, and there are many players. If the United States is to = be=20 successful, it must divide, manipulate and conquer that world along the = lines of=20 its complexity. The Sunni-Shiite fault line is one axis, but the = division=20 between countries that are motivated by mercenary considerations, as = opposed to=20 those that have more complex motives, is another.

The UAE wants = to do=20 business, and it is good at it. One of its businesses is managing ports. = Purchasing a British company in the same industry is a natural thing to = do in=20 business; the fact that the purchase in question would give the UAE = company=20 oversight of ports in the United States is another attraction of the = deal. The=20 attraction is not that the UAE could facilitate the movement of al Qaeda = operatives into the United States; that is not what the UAE is after, = since it=20 would be bad for business. What it is after is the profits that come = from doing=20 the business.

Now, some argue that this business deal will make = it=20 easier for al Qaeda operatives to get into the United States. We find = that=20 doubtful. Al Qaeda operatives -- the real ones, not the wannabes -- if = they are=20 out there, will get into the United States just fine by a number of = means. And=20 if they try to slip a bomb into a container ship, it won't be one sent = from a=20 Muslim country -- the level of scrutiny there is too high. It would be = from a=20 place and under a flag that no one would suspect for a moment, like = Denmark. At=20 any rate, given what it means to "operate a port," the risk to the = United States=20 from having a British company manage its ports is about the same as that = from=20 the UAE: Has anyone noticed that holding a British passport these days = is no=20 guarantee of loyalty to Western ideals?

The Administration's=20 Strategy

The point here is not to argue the merits of the = Dubai ports=20 deal, but rather to place the business deal in the context of the U.S. = grand=20 strategy. That strategy is, again, to split the Islamic world into its = component=20 parts, induce divisions by manipulating differences, and to create = coalitions=20 based on particular needs. This is, currently, about the only strategy = the=20 United States has going for it -- and if it can't use commercial = relations as an=20 inducement in the Muslim world, that is quite a weapon to lose. =

The=20 problem has become political, and stunningly so. One of the most recent = opinion=20 polls, by CBS, has placed Bush's approval rating at 34 percent -- a = fairly=20 shocking decline, and clearly attributable to the port issue. As we have = noted=20 in the past, each party has a core constituency of about 35-37 percent. = When=20 support falls significantly below this level, a president loses his = ability to=20 govern.

The Republican coalition consists of three parts: social = conservatives, economic conservatives and business interests, and = national=20 security conservatives. The port deal has apparently hit the national = security=20 conservatives in Bush's coalition hard. They were already shaky over the = administration's personnel policies in the military and the question of = whether=20 he had a clear strategy in Iraq, even as they supported the invasion.=20

Another part of the national security faction consists of those = who=20 believe that the Muslim world as a whole is, in the end, united against = the=20 United States, and that it poses a clear and present danger. Bush used = to own=20 this faction, but the debate over the ports has generated serious doubts = among=20 this faction about Bush's general policy. In their eyes, he appears = inconsistent=20 and potentially hypocritical. Economic conservatives might love the = ports deal,=20 and so might conservatives of the "realpolitik" variety, but those who = buy into=20 the view that there is a general danger of terrorism emanating from all = Muslim=20 countries are appalled -- and it is showing in the polls.

If Bush = sinks=20 much lower, he will breaks into territory from which it would be = impossible for=20 a presidency to recover. He is approaching this territory with three = years left=20 in his presidency. It is the second time that he has probed this region: = The=20 first was immediately after Hurricane Katrina. He is now down deeper in = the=20 polls, and it is cutting into his core constituency.

In effect, = Bush's=20 strategy and his domestic politics have intersected with potential = fratricidal=20 force. The fact is that the U.S. strategy of dividing the Muslim world = and=20 playing one part off against the other is a defensible and sophisticated = strategy -- even if does not, in the end, turn out to be successful (and = who can=20 tell about that?) This is not the strategy the United States started = with; the=20 strategy emerged out of the failures in Iraq in 2003. But whatever its = origins,=20 it is the strategy that is being used, and it is not a foolish=20 strategy.

The problem is that the political coalition has eroded = to the=20 point that Bush needs all of his factions, and this policy -- = particularly=20 because of the visceral nature of the ports issue -- is cutting into the = heart=20 of his coalition. The general problem is this: The administration has = provided=20 no framework for understanding the connection between a destroyed mosque = dome in=20 As Samarra, an attack against a crucial oil facility in Saudi Arabia, = and the=20 UAE buyout of a British ports-management firm. Rather than being = discussed in=20 the light of a single, integrated strategy, these appear to be random, = disparate=20 and uncoordinated events. The reality of the administration's strategy = and the=20 reality of its politics are colliding. Bush will backtrack on the ports = issue,=20 and the UAE will probably drop the matter. But what is not clear is = whether the=20 damage done to the strategy and the politics can be undone. The numbers = are just=20 getting very low.=20
Send questions or comments on this article to = analysis@stratfor.com.
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